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Recent research debates the effects of exposure to narrative fiction on recognition of
mental states in others and self, referred to as Theory of Mind. The current study
explores the mechanisms by which such effects could occur in fictional film. Using
manipulated film scenes, we conducted a between subject experiment (N = 136)
exploring how film shot-scale affects viewers’ Theory of Mind. Specifically, in our
methods we distinguish between the trait Theory of Mind abilities (ToM ability), and the
state-like tendency to recognize mental states in others and self (ToM tendency). Results
showed that close-up shots (compared to long shots) of a character was associated
with higher levels of Theory of Mind tendency, when the facial expression was sad but
not when it was neutral. And this effect did not transfer to other characters in the film.
There was also no observable effect of character depiction on viewers’ general Theory
of Mind ability. Together the findings suggest that formal and content features of shot
scale can elicit Theory of Mind responses by directing attention toward character mental
states rather than improving viewers’ general Theory of Mind ability.
Keywords: theory of mind, shot scale, close up shot, facial expression, characters, film
INTRODUCTION
Theory of Mind (ToM), the psychological process by which people recognize and understand
the mental states of others is arguably the most important process to human social functioning
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Tomasello, 1999; Frith, 2012). Supporting this idea, marked social
difficulties have been associated with deficits in ToM ability (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2010) and a low level of mind perception is associated with dehumanization or
stigmatization of others (Cameron et al., 2015). Researchers distinguish between the representation
of thoughts (cognitive ToM), feelings (affective ToM) and motivations (intentional ToM) of
the other (e.g., Dziobek et al., 2008; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). A large body of work also
links ToM and related social cognition processes with understanding mental states in the self
(Gallese, 2003; Decety and Sommerville, 2003; Neal and Chartrand, 2011; Erbas et al., 2016),
further demonstrating the importance of ToM skills. Given the high social value of ToM,
researchers are particularly interested in ways to elicit ToM and foster interpersonal sensitivity
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(Meyer and Lieberman, 2016). Recently, it has been proposed
that engagement with narrative fiction is particularly effective in
this regard. Drawing on a well-established body of research that
identifies the significance of facial-cues in social cognition (e.g.,
Ekman and Friesen, 1971; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; van Kleef,
2009), we predict that manipulating film viewers’ visual access to
such social cues via shot scale in fictional film narrative will affect
ToM response toward characters. We use a true experimental
design to explore how shot-scale affects viewers’ ToM. By
embedding our research in the everyday act of natural film-
viewing, this study offers a high-level of experimental control
and a high-level of ecological validity; two typically conflicting
characteristics that have been difficult to resolve in research to
date.
Narrative fiction has high potential for evoking ToM
responses (Mar et al., 2006). Research has demonstrated that
high quality literary fiction (Kidd and Castano, 2013, 2016,
2017; Pino and Mazza, 2016), cinematic fiction (Black and
Barnes, 2015) and narrativized video-games (Bormann and
Greitemeyer, 2015) can improve ToM performance. These
findings, however, seem to be difficult to replicate (Panero
et al., 2016; Pino and Mazza, 2016), which may be a symptom
of the fact that little is known about the mechanisms (in
the viewer or the media) that facilitate the increase in ToM.
Researchers draw on the work of Mar and Oatley (2008)
and propose that ToM performance was superior because the
fictional narratives elicited mental simulation and abstraction
of social experience. They attribute the ToM performance
effects to the effort involved in constructing a mental model
of the characters. If this is true then it is reasonable to
predict that features of the media may challenge or guide
the construction of mental models and differentially affect
ToM.
A growing body of work shows that audio–visual narratives
are of special importance in eliciting ToM (see Levin et al.,
2013; Tan, 2013). One of the main advantages of film over
other media is the central role of faces in telling the story.
The visual cues carried within human faces are strongly
associated with ToM response (Calder et al., 2002; Mosconi
et al., 2005; Itier et al., 2007; Itier and Batty, 2009; Fischer
et al., 2012). For example, facial expressions and gaze direction
are salient triggers of ToM (Frischen et al., 2007). van Kleef’s
(2009) Emotions as Social Information (EASI) model explains
the link between emotional expression and the observer’s
response via inferential and affective reactions. Within this
framework, numerous studies have demonstrated the effects of
emotional expressions on viewers’ character judgments (Hareli
and Hess, 2010), attributions (van Doorn et al., 2015), and
inferences about intentions (van Kleef et al., 2004; de Melo
et al., 2014). Specific expressions (such as sadness or fear)
include social information that tells a story to the viewer
(Parkinson, 1999, 2001; Hareli and Hess, 2010). Testament
to the importance of reading facial expressions in narrative,
Cutting and Armstrong (2016) demonstrate that filmmakers use
longer durations for scenes that present faces at a distance,
amongst clutter, and argue that this is because viewers need
more time to successfully read character expression in a cluttered
context. This demonstrates the formal features, such as shot-
scale, play an important role in mediating social information in
a film.
Shot-scale, defined as the apparent distance of characters
from the camera, is one of the most effective visual devices
in regulating the relative size of characters’ faces, the relative
proportion of the human figure to the background (Salt, 1992;
Bowen and Thompson, 2013), and arranging film content
according to its saliency (Carroll and Seeley, 2013). It has
an impact on self-reported arousal (Canini et al., 2011),
prosocial behavior (Cao, 2013), and character liking (Mutz,
2006). Previously, Bálint et al. (2016) observed a relationship
between ToM responding and shot-scale distribution within
a film. This study found that films with a higher proportion
of closer shots (compared to films with fewer or no close
shots) evoked higher levels of ToM responding. While the
study statistically controlled for various potentially confounding
variables, the test condition stimuli were different films (different
stories, with different characters). Thus the study was subject
to the typical trade-off between experimental control and
ecological validity that has been common in the previous
research to date. To overcome this limitation, by working with
professional animation designers and filmmakers, the present
study manipulates shot-scale (by inserting specifically designed
close-up shots) into a film, while holding all other variables
constant.
Previous research showing a relationship between shot-scale
and ToM have failed to clarify if ToM is specifically targeted
toward the character who is shown in close-up. It may be
reasonable to predict that showing a close-up of a character
would elicit ToM toward that character exclusively, yet previous
research seems to claim that engagement with fiction results in
a non-specific activation of ToM (e.g., Kidd and Castano, 2013;
Black and Barnes, 2015). In that case, we would see a transfer
effect of target character close-ups on ToM responses toward
non-target characters. Thus the present study distinguishes
between references to mental states of the target character (who
featured in the close-ups) and a non-target character (a character
who is seen only in extreme or very long-shots).
Previous studies exploring the effect of narrative fiction have
primarily used tasks that explicitly require participants, in a
forced-choice test, to identify emotional states (Reading the
Mind in the Eyes test; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), thoughts
(Yoni task; Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007; Kalbe
et al., 2010) or beliefs (False-belief task; Wimmer and Perner,
1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) from faces or descriptions
of scenarios (Happé, 1993, 1994). While these measures have
been widely and reliably used for decades (e.g., see Wellman
et al., 2001; Fernández-Abascal et al., 2013; Devine and Hughes,
2016), they prompt ToM by explicitly asking about mental
states (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Rosenblau et al., 2015).
The nature of these tasks allows them to successfully tap
into participants’ ToM ability (or competence). It has been
argued that beyond one’s ability to understand mental states,
people demonstrate individual differences in their tendency to
do so, resulting in a ‘competence–performance gap’ (e.g., Meins
et al., 2014). Unlike recent distinctions between explicit and
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implicit ToM, that concern a person’s conscious awareness of
their deliberate efforts to mentalize, the distinction between
ability and tendency concerns the extent to which a person
is prompted or spontaneously models the mental states of
another. Apperly (2012) argues that when exploring ToM
we must recognize the distinction between the ability to
conceive of the mind of the other, the mental processes
involved in doing so, and the tendency to pay attention or
care about the mind of the other. Prompting tasks are less
sensitive to the absence of mental state references, and are
less valid representations of individual differences in adults’
spontaneous ToM (Meins and Fernyhough, 1999). This calls
for the use of a measure of ToM-tendency, without which we
can say little about unprompted social cognition in everyday
life.
Addressing these abovementioned issues, this study employed
a data collection method that distinguishes TOM-tendency
and TOM-ability (Bálint et al., 2014). It also allows us to
break ToM down further by coding whether the participant is
mentalizing the character’s cognition, emotion and intentions.
Previous studies demonstrated that emotional and cognitive
processes of social cognition are interdependent but separate
mechanisms in the brain (Dziobek et al., 2008; Zaki and Ochsner,
2012). Therefore, our coding system differentiated whether
the theory of mind response referred to cognitive, emotional
or intentional mental states in the character. Our procedure
was informed by standardized assessments of ToM processes
using story-based stimuli and qualitative data collection (Heavey
et al., 2000; Dziobek et al., 2006; Golan et al., 2006; Barnes
et al., 2009; Dodell-Feder et al., 2013). We are also interested
in exploring the way in which character depiction affects
references to one’s own mental states (hereafter referred to
as ToM-self). This is particularly interesting in light of
recent research showing that reading fiction does not elicit a
shared emotional state with the characters (Pino and Mazza,
2016).
Our over-arching research question asks how shot-scale affects
ToM, that is, the degree to which viewers perceive film-characters
as intentional agents with mental states. To partition effects of
shot scale from the content of the shot, we also manipulate
facial expression of the character in the shot. We refer to
these formal and content aspects of shot scale together as
“character depiction.” The main research question has three
parts: we examine the effect of character depiction on ToM-
tendency (RQ1), on ToM-ability (RQ2), and on ToM-self (RQ3).
In all cases we predict that close ups increase ToM responses
compared to long shots, and this effect will be more pronounced
when the target is depicted in a close up with a sad facial
expression compared to a neutral facial expression. The use
of additional facial expressions may lead to interesting results
in the context of the current study, but would each require
an additional experimental group in the research design (and
thus more participants). As an initial exploration, we use a
sad facial expression due to its strong congruence with the
major themes of separation in the film, the accompanying
music and because a sad expression tends to signal affective
tendencies in the observer (Knutson, 1996; Hess et al., 2000;
Hareli and Hess, 2010). Aside from testing our main hypotheses,
for RQ1 and RQ2, we predict that ToM responses will be
higher for the target character than for a non-target character,




The present study was an online experiment (Qualtrics software)
with an incomplete mixed-design. Shot-scale of character (Long-
shot vs. Close-up) and Facial expression (Sad vs. Neutral) were
levels to the between subject variable collectively referred to
as “Character Depiction.” The incomplete design was necessary
because facial expression can be only manipulated in close-up
condition but not in long shot, where character faces are not seen.
The study design also included Character (Target vs. Non-target)
as a within subject variable. ToM-tendency and ToM-ability were
dependent variables.
Participants
Power analysis called for a sample between 117 and 141 so as
to achieve sufficient power (0.9; α = 0.05) to detect medium
effect sizes. Recruiting through a university student participant
pool, 170 people started the experiment; 26 of them did not
complete the outcome measures and so could not be included
in the study. Four participants were excluded due to excessively
long duration with the stimulus (>6.5 min) indicating that
they did not progress through the study in line with other
participants (e.g., rewatching the video or engaging in other
tasks). In addition, 2 participants were excluded for reporting
to have seen the whole film before and 2 for reporting that they
write English at an intermediate level or lower, as this may have
affected their ability to express their ToM response (all other
participants reported very good, fluent or native-speaker English
abilities). Thus the final sample consisted of 136 participants
(78 female, 34 male, 24 did not report gender; age: M = 22.06,
SD= 8.71).
Stimulus Material
We used the first two sequences (2 min) of the multi-
international-award winning animated film Father and Daughter
(Dudok de Wit, 2001) with two characters, a man (non-target
character) and a girl (target character). This segment included
the title screen “Father and Daughter” and credits. The film is a
two-dimensional hand-drawn animation, created in a simplistic
style, characterized by a limited color palette and simple lines
[see Bateman (2014) and Suckfüll (2010) for a formal analysis
of the film and responses toward moments of narrative impact].
The film is accompanied by instrumental music (Waves of the
Danube), but it contains no dialog or lyrics. The first sequence
presents a man (non-target character) and a girl (target character)
riding bicycles through a landscape. They arrive to a tree at
a lake where the man gets off the bicycle. The girl stops and
gets off her bicycle too. The man walks down to the water to a
boat, then returns to hug the girl. He walks back to the water,
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sits into the boat and rows away. The girl stays there standing
and watches him rowing away. In the second sequence the girl
is again on the same road riding her bicycle. She stops at the
same tree, looks at the water, and after a moment she leaves
again.
To manipulate the depiction of the target character (shot-
scale and facial expression) we developed three different versions
of the film excerpt (original version in long-shots, and two
manipulated versions in close-ups). The first sequence presents
the target character in a point of view shot as she looks at the
man rowing away; the second point of view shot at the end
of the second sequence presents her again as she looks at the
water. In the manipulated versions of the film this long-shot
(see Figure 1) was replaced by a close-up of the target character
with either a sad or neutral facial expression (see Figure 1).
Animation designers created and edited these close-up shots into
the film to be a perfect fit to the style of the original artwork.
The length of the films and close-up shots were kept constant.
In all conditions the non-target character was depicted in long
shots.
In a pilot study we tested the designed close-up shots for
emotionality to make sure that the faces were perceived as neutral
or sad. Thirty-one participants (15 females; 24 – 38 years old,
M = 31:28; SD = 3.96 years) rated the test faces, after they were
given some minor context. The faces were randomly selected
by Qualtrics online survey designer, and presented in the order
they would appear during the film. For each face, participants
had to estimate the age of the depicted character (this is relevant
to the narrative), and rate the perceived intensity of discrete
emotions (i.e., emotionless, happy, sad, angry, disgusted, fearful,
other emotion) on a 9-point scale from “not at all” to “very
much.” For each face, the average ratings on each emotion
were calculated, these were then combined by group to give
a group average rating on each emotion. Comparison of the
mean ratings for each group showed that neutral faces evoked
significantly higher ratings than sad faces on the dimensions
of emotionless, t(21.91) = −5.65, p < 0.05, CI95 = −4.64,
−2.15, and happy, t(29) = −2.21, p < 0.05, CI95 = −1.42,
−0.056; and significantly lower ratings on dimensions of sad,
t(29) = 5.70, p < 0.05, CI95 = 1.71, 3.62, angry, t(29) = 5.63,
p < 0.05, CI95 = 1.49, 3.21, disgust, t(29) = 3.12, p < 0.05,
CI95 = 0.51, 2.42, and fear t(29) = 4.98, p < 0.05, CI95 = 1.52,
3.64.
Procedure
The study was approved by the University College Dublin
Research Ethics Committee. Participants were asked to complete
the experiment in one sitting in an undistracted environment.
First they reported their proficiency in the English language;
then they were randomly assigned to one of three conditions
(Long-shot, Sad close-up or Neutral close-up). After the film,
participants responded to three open-ended questions (see
Table 1). The first question asked participants to describe
the story and was designed to allow for ToM-tendency
responses. The second question was designed to capture
ToM-ability using a prompt to describe the story from the
target character’s perspective. Finally, we prompted participants
to describe their own experience so as to capture ToM-
self. These questions were carefully designed to allow us to
explore various ToM effects while minimizing demands on
the participants. For example, we decided to use the same
question to explore manipulation effects on both target and non-
target characters. Once participants responded to these, they
completed quantitative control measures of their experience and
answered questions about their demographics. At the end of
the session, participants were debriefed. Mental state references
FIGURE 1 | Images of character depiction by condition. Each row depicts an experimental condition. Participants watched a sequence containing two scenes.
Depending on the condition, the shot presented in the first and third column (Scenes 1 and 2) was followed by a different shot. Condition 1 (top row) = Long shot is
followed by another long shot with no visible facial expression; Condition 2 (middle row): Long shot is followed by a close up shot with neutral facial expression;
Condition 3 (bottom row): Long shot is followed by a close-up shot with sad facial expression.
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ToM-tendency Q.1 Implicit question for unprompted ToM
Please describe the story of the film scene in as much
detail as possible using at least 6–10 sentences.
ToM-ability Q.2 Explicit question prompting ToM for character
Try to imagine the story from the perspective of the
female character, how would you describe her feelings,
thoughts, and intentions? Please write at least 6–10
sentences.
ToM-self Q.3 Explicit question prompting ToM for self
Describe your own experience during the movie. What
happened to you while watching it? How would you
describe your thoughts and feelings? Please write at
least 6–10 sentences.
were assessed using a quantitative content-analytic method by a
trained coder, blind to the experimental conditions, developed
in prior work (Bálint et al., 2014, 2016) and detailed in the
next section. For each of the coded dependent variables, a
randomly selected ten percent of descriptions was coded by
another independent rater. Agreement was calculated for each
variable using Krippendorf ’s Alpha; these yielded acceptable
levels of agreement (α= 0.67 to 1).
Measures
ToM-Tendency
To measure ToM-tendency we coded responses to question 1,
identifying where participants made explicit reference to a mental
state. These mental state references were also categorized as
referring to the target (female) or the non-target (male) character,
and by type of mental state (affective, cognitive or intention; see
Table 2). Once coded, each participant’s response was given a
score for the frequency of mental state references, where higher
scores are indicative of higher levels of ToM-tendency in a
category.
ToM-Ability
The ability to use ToM was assessed by coding mental state
references occurring in answers to question 2 (which prompted
ToM). Again all utterances were coded for explicit references to
character mental states and categorized by character (target/non-
target) and by type. Higher scores mean more frequent references
to mental states, indicating a higher level of ToM-ability.
ToM-Self
References to one’s own mental states were coded in responses to
question 3 that explicitly prompted reflection on the participant’s
own experience. Once the mental state reference was coded as a
self-reference, it was further classified into one of three ToM types
described in Table 2.
Controls
Besides gender, and age, we asked participants to indicate
the highest level of education they obtained (see Table 3).




Reference to. . . Example
Affect Wishes, desires, or feelings ‘Anxious,’ ‘excited,’ ‘feeling lonely’
Cognition Memory function ‘Forget,’ ‘remember,’ ‘was reminded’
Knowledge ‘Realize,’ ‘understand,’ ‘assume’
Other cognition/metacognition ‘Imagine,’ ‘accept,’ ‘pretend’
Intention Expressed by an explicit word ‘Intend,’ ‘determined to,’ ‘attempt’
Expressed by a preposition ‘To,’ ‘so that,’ ‘in order to’
Expressed by a modal verb ‘Have to,’ ‘must,’ ‘want’
∗References to mental states of target (female), non-target (male) and self were
coded separately.
We also included control variables for familiarity with the
film scene (yes or no); perceived quality of the film; self-
reported proficiency in the English language (from 0 for
basic proficiency in writing to 4 for first language); size of
screen used; and word count of response to the open ended
questions.
Data Analysis
Open responses were coded and group mean scores were
calculated separately for target and non-target characters. Data
were cleaned, distributions were explored, and descriptive
statistics are reported in Table 3. Given the nature of the
data (count data) the hypotheses were tested using Poisson
regression. The independent (predictor) variables were Character
depiction condition (Long-shot vs. Sad close-up vs. Neutral
close-up), and Character (Target vs. Non-Target). Frequency of
mental state references (categorized as ToM-tendency, ToM-
ability, and ToM-self) were offset against the log transformed
word count in participants’ responses, to account for individual
response length in a way that is required for analysis of count
data (Agresti, 2003). In addition, to account for the personal
relevance of the story, reported gender and age were included as
covariates.
RESULTS
Before testing the hypotheses, a series of one-way ANOVA
revealed no significant difference between the experimental
groups in their level of English, F(2,133) = 1.373,
p > 0.05, education, F(2,109) = 0.266, p > 0.05, age,
F(2,109) = 1.383, p > 0.05, or the size of the screen that
they viewed the film on, F(2,109) = 0.472, p > 0.05 (see
Table 3). Importantly, there was no significant difference
observed between the groups in perceived quality of the
film, F(2,109) = 1.133, p > 0.05 demonstrating that the
manipulation did not significantly detract from the viewing
experience.
ToM-Tendency
To answer RQ1, we tested how Character depiction (close-up
and facial expression) affected participants’ ToM-tendency,
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TABLE 3 | Means and standard deviations for output and other variables.
Long Shot (Original) Close-up Neutral Close-up Sad Scale
M SD M SD M SD
ToM-tendency for target 2.29 2.14 1.97 1.52 3.17 2.14 ∼
ToM-tendency for target (Affective) 1.11 1.60 1.14 1.36 1.86 1.53 ∼
ToM-tendency for target (Cognitive) 0.74 0.85 0.51 0.90 0.72 0.97 ∼
ToM-tendency for target (Intentions) 0.43 0.61 0.32 0.53 0.58 0.65 ∼
ToM-tendency for non-target 1.23 1.68 0.76 0.95 1.28 1.47 ∼
ToM-ability for target 9.69 4.54 8.81 4.06 10.69 5.13 ∼
ToM-ability for non-target 0.54 1.01 0.35 0.72 0.36 0.54 ∼
ToM-self 5.80 3.15 6.21 3.74 6.67 3.84 ∼
ToM-self (Affective mental states) 3.89 2.35 4.62 3.18 5.08 3.20 ∼
ToM-self (Cognitive mental states) 1.74 1.75 1.68 1.53 1.39 1.18 ∼
ToM-self (Intentions) 0.17 0.45 0.05 0.23 0.19 0.47 ∼
Level of english 1.05 0.22 1.06 0.02 1.00 0.00 (First language) 1 to 5
(basic proficiency)
Highest level of formal education 4.00 1.47 3.76 1.38 3.92 1.42 1 (none), 2 (Secondary education, not
completed), 3 (Secondary education,
completed), 4 (Trade/Apprenticeship), 5
(Higher cert/Diploma), 6 (Bachelors
Degree, 7 (Masters/Ph.D.).
Age 21.83 8.46 23.82 11.09 20.53 5.60 Age in years
Screen size 3.75 0.94 3.87 0.99 3.66 0.91 (Cinema size) 1 to 6 (<than smart
phone)
Perceived film quality 4.68 1.60 5.11 1.56 4.63 1.46 (Bad) 1 to 7 (good)
∼Average number of mental state references in a response that was 6 – 10 sentences (in the inferential analysis, Poisson Regression, this was offset against the log
transformed word count of the response).
and if this differs for the target and non-target character.
Analysis revealed a significant interaction between the depiction
and the character (target/non-target), F(5,214) = 17.43,
p < 0.01. Results demonstrated that the manipulation
affected responses toward the target but not the non-target
character (see Figure 2). Pairwise contrasts (using least
significant difference) demonstrated that participants in the
sad close-up condition made significantly more references to
target character’s mental states than those in the long-shot
condition, b(0.053) = 0.104, p = 0.05, and the neutral close-
up condition, b(0.051) = 0.128, p = 0.013. This pattern of
findings is in line with our prediction that participants in
the sad close-up condition would demonstrate the highest
level of ToM-tendency, and that it was directed toward the
target character’s mental states (rather than the non-target
character).
To explore the effect of character depiction further, we
tested its effect on the type of mental states for the target
character. Results revealed a significant interaction effect
between depiction and type of mental state, F(8,322) = 7.781;
p < 0.05. Pairwise comparisons demonstrated that the
sad close-up condition was associated with significantly
more references to the target character’s affective mental
states, than the neutral close-up, b(0.047) = 0.095,
p = 0.045, or long-shot conditions, b(0.046) = 0.104,
p = 0.025. No significant effects of character depiction
were evident for the mental state references to cognitions
or intentions.
ToM-Ability
RQ2 explored the effect of character depiction on ToM-ability.
While mean levels of mental state references where higher
for all conditions in question 2 (which explicitly prompted
ToM) compared to question 1, using the same analysis, no
significant effects of depiction were observed for the target,
F(2,214) = 0.38, p > 0.05 or for the non-target characters,
F(2,214) = 1.27, p > 0.05 (see Figure 2). These results do
not support our prediction that the inclusion of close-up shots
(especially emotional close-up shots) elicits participants’ ToM-
ability toward the target character, and thus hypothesis 2 was not
supported.
ToM-Self
Finally, we tested hypothesis 3 predicting that Character
depiction would affect references to one’s own mental states
(ToM-self). Results showed a marginally significant effect of
depiction on the frequency of ToM-self, χ2(4)= 9.16, p= 0.057.
Relative to the long-shot condition, participants in the neutral
close-up condition referred to their own mental states more
frequently, χ2(1) = 3.137, Exp(B) = 1.13; CI95 = [0.987, 1.29];
p = 0.077. This effect was even stronger for the sad close-up
condition, χ2(1) = 3.713, Exp(B) = 1.139; CI95 = [0.998, 1.30];
p= 0.054, with no significant effect observed between the neutral
and sad close-up conditions, χ2(1) = 0.023, Exp(B) = 0.990;
CI95 = [0.870, 1.126]; p = 0.879. Thus it seems shot-scale and
facial expression affected ToM-self, in line with hypothesis 3.
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FIGURE 2 | Average number of mental state references indicating theory of mind tendency (top) and ability (bottom) with 95% Confidence Intervals (means shown
regardless of word-count). Mental state references are presented categorized by whether they referred to the Target character or Non-target character. The
conditions listed on the X-axis indicate the way in which the target character was depicted (non-target character was depicted in long shot for each condition).
∗ToM-tendency was significantly higher in for the target character when she was presented in close-up with a sad facial expression.
DISCUSSION
Using highly controlled yet ecologically valid film stimuli in a true
experimental design, we explored the effect of character depiction
on viewers’ social cognition. Specifically, we were interested in
viewers’ tendency to reference character mental states (ToM-
tendency) and their ability to do so when prompted (ToM-
ability). Our findings demonstrate that shot-scale and facial
expression do affect social cognition. Specifically, we observed
that the close-ups of sad faces produced significantly higher
ToM-tendency than other conditions, and that the use of a
neutral close-up produced no more ToM-tendency than the
long-shot version. This suggests that the increase in ToM-
tendency response is not driven by merely presenting the
character’s face larger in the frame (i.e., at a smaller spatial
distance from the viewer), but rather it is the social and
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emotional information carried by the face that drives ToM-
tendency responses. Importantly, this work extends the findings
of previous research which demonstrated that exposure to fiction
films (as opposed to documentary films) can elicit ToM response
(Black and Barnes, 2015) by further exploring the way in
which formal features of the narrative can effect types of ToM
responding.
Supporting hypothesis 1, the current findings demonstrate
an effect of character depiction on participants’ ToM-tendency.
More specifically, the close-up shots of the target character with
a sad facial expression were associated with higher tendency to
refer to the target character’s mental states. Breaking down this
finding into the different types of ToM response, we found that
the effect was driven by affective ToM. That is, the increase in
ToM response primarily consisted of references to the target
character’s affective mental states, rather than her cognition
or intention. The manipulation of facial expression was one
of emotional valence; the faces presented were either sad or
emotionless. Thus this finding is in line with that of previous
research showing that sad expressions elicit affective responses
in observers (Knutson, 1996; Hess et al., 2000; Hareli and Hess,
2010). In line with this work, we predict that the ratio of
references to the target character’s feelings, thoughts or intentions
may change in the context of a different film or if future
researchers use different manipulations of facial expression, e.g.,
a thoughtful face.
An important aim of the present study was to explore
whether the ToM-eliciting effect of seeing characters in close-
up transfers to character depicted only in long shot (non-
target character). Results of the current study showed no
effect of character depiction on ToM responding toward
the non-target character. Given that the inserted close-up
shots did not feature the male character, this is perhaps
not surprising. Indeed the characters in the stimulus of the
current study differed not only in shot scale but along other
dimensions (e.g., gender, age, appearance) which may have
also inhibited a transfer effect. Nevertheless it is important
because it demonstrates no effect of character depiction on any
general form of ToM responses, where previous researchers
have reported such general ToM effects using other media
formats (e.g., Kidd and Castano, 2013, 2016, 2017; Black
and Barnes, 2015; Pino and Mazza, 2016). In line with this,
when prompted to recount the narrative events from the
perspective of the target character (question 2), all groups
demonstrated a higher frequency of mental state references to
the target character, with no difference between conditions. This
demonstrates that when called upon to do so, there was no
difference between groups in terms of participants’ ability to
mentalize. Thus the use of close-up shots does not increase
ToM responding by activating some enhanced mentalizing ability
toward all characters, but rather it demonstrates, that close-
ups work by directing our attention to the salient aspects
of particular characters in the narrative. This is in line with
Peskin and Astington’s (2004) findings that adding metacognitive
language (words expressing character mental states) into stories
improved children’s vocabulary on mental states, but not their
performance in a false belief test. It seems that emotional
words in printed media have similar function to emotional
faces in visual media. Furthermore, filmmakers are skilled
in their ability to direct attention toward such important
social cues (Loschky et al., 2015; Cutting and Armstrong,
2016).
Character depiction also appears to have affected references
to one’s own mental states (ToM-self). Close-ups of sad faces
produced higher levels of ToM-self than other conditions.
Results show that the neutral close-up condition produced
more references to participants’ own emotions than the long-
shot condition, and the sad close-up condition produced even
more references to participants’ own emotions. These findings
show a similar pattern as ToM-tendency responses for the
target. They suggest that shot-scale and facial expression do not
increase ToM-ability in general, but rather it increases one’s
tendency to mentalize toward the target, and in doing so may
facilitate identification of their own mental states. This finding
is in line with the large body of research linking the processes
of social cognition of others, with self (e.g., Vygotsky, 1978;
Neisser, 1988; Gallese, 2003) and the evidence for overlapping
neural mechanisms in these processes (Decety and Jackson,
2004; Gallese, 2007; Lieberman, 2007; Rooney et al., 2012).
Drawing on this work, we argue that directing attention to
others’ mental states, aids recognition of one’s own mental
states.
Synthesis
Taken together, the findings have implications for our
understanding of the nature of ToM responses toward
characters. They demonstrated that viewers did not differ
in their ToM-ability, but rather they differed in their ToM-
tendency. Showing the sad facial expression of a fictional
character makes viewer mental states more readily available
and featured more in their unprompted responses. But when
prompted, all groups demonstrated the ability to call on social
cognitive faculties to model the characters’ mental states. These
findings have important implications for the way in which
ToM responses are measured in future research studies, and
how they have been measured in the past. Here we show the
way in which participants are asked about the experience can
have a large impact on the findings. Accessing unprompted
ToM responses may show differences that are not evident
in prompted responses. This is particularly important given
that so many ToM measures use direct questions to assess
participants’ ability to mentalize, rather than observing their
uncontaminated responses. The failure to distinguish between
these aspects of ToM may explain why previous research
has presented conflicting and ambiguous results (e.g., Kidd
and Castano, 2013, 2016, 2017; Panero et al., 2016; Pino and
Mazza, 2016). In line with researchers such as Apperly (2012),
Meins et al. (2014), and Rosenblau et al. (2015), we argue that
capturing unprompted ToM responses taps in to participant’s
ToM-tendency and is representative of how ToM manifests in
everyday life. Thus we too, call on researchers to give careful
consideration to the operational definitions of social cognition
they employ and the claims that can be made from their
findings.
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Limitations and Implications for Future
Work
The strength of our own claims is somewhat limited by our
focus on a single emotion manipulation, in a single film
stimulus. Indeed the stimulus used was an animation rather
than live action. This means that our findings presented in
the context of simple highly designed visual information and
call on future research to extend the findings with even
more ecological validity. Nevertheless, we argue that this is an
important strength of our work too. The stimulus used (its
design and manipulation) offers a degree of experimental control
that is typically difficult to achieve, without contaminating the
ecological validity of the study. This major strength of the
current study, compliments previous research that explored the
relationship between ToM responses and shot-scale distribution
in different films (Bálint et al., 2016). Taken together these
studies, using various films (Bálint et al., 2016) and in a
single experimentally manipulated film (the present study)
provide evidence that the distribution of close-up shots may
be utilized to increase ToM responding. Importantly, here
we do not propose that simply inserting close-up shots into
film will automatically generate increased ToM responses in
viewers. Indeed, our findings that show an effect for the facial
expression demonstrate that the social information presented
in the close-up is particularly important in directing attention
toward character mental states. In addition, we recognize that
other ways in which the close-up is used will drive the ToM
responses. Future research needs to explore these subtleties
further by, for example, manipulating the number and position
of the close-ups used, or how the depiction of the character
might interact with viewer identity or personal relevance of the
narrative.
We propose that using close-up shots of a sad expression
drew participants’ attention to the character’s mental states, made
character mental states more accessible and thus more likely
to be integrated into viewers’ models of the narrative. To be
clear, we make this proposal for the current sample, and those
within a population that they represent. The current sample of
participants where relatively young adults in university education
and our findings demonstrated that when eventually prompted to
take the perspective of the target character, all groups regardless
of condition, were able to do so. It is clear that the nature of
our sample (convenient sample of volunteers) limits the extent
to which the findings might generalize. While we stand by the
way in which these findings speak to previous research, with
similar limitations, we expect future research to build upon this
limitation and design novel ways in which data can be collected
(ethically) from a more representative and diverse population.
For example, it remains to be seen how these findings may be
extended to populations with deficits in social cognition such
as participants with autism or schizophrenia. These populations
may not be able to mentalize when prompted to do so. We might
speculate that simply inserting close-ups would not increase
ToM responding for an autistic population without some form
of guidance or scaffolding, i.e., additional resources to draw
attention to relevant social information.
CONCLUSION
Using a true experimental design, with highly controlled visual
stimuli in an ecologically valid activity, the present study makes
an important contribution to our understanding of theory of
mind response. The findings indicate that depiction of the
character can direct attentional focus toward their mental
states, making them more accessible to the viewer and thus
increasing viewers’ tendency to use those mental states in a
representation of the narrative. However, mere exposure to
close-up faces of characters does not enhance general theory
of mind ability, nor does it transfer to mentalizing with
other characters depicted in long shots. Finally, the findings
demonstrate that directing viewers’ attention to the mental
states of characters also elicits viewers’ modeling of their own
mental state, supporting the idea that understanding mental
states in others is linked to understanding self. Findings of
the present study show that shot scale and facial expression
of character depiction is a powerful tool for shaping viewers’
recognition of mental states in characters on screen and in
self.
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